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Abstract: Virtue epistemologists define knowledge as true belief produced by intellectual virtue. 
In this paper, I review how this definition fails in three important ways. First, it fails as an ac-
count of the ordinary knowledge concept, because neither belief nor reliability is essential to 
knowledge ordinarily understood. Second, it fails as an account of the knowledge relation itself, 
insofar as that relation is operationalized in the scientific study of cognition. Third, it serves no 
prescriptive purpose identified up till now. An alternative theory, abilism, provides a superior ac-
count of knowledge as it is ordinarily and scientifically understood. According to abilism, 
knowledge is an accurate representation produced by cognitive ability. 
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A popular view in contemporary Anglophone epistemology is that knowledge is true belief pro-
duced by intellectual virtue. Philosophers accepting this are often called “virtue epistemologists.” 
Virtue epistemologists differ on how to characterize an intellectual virtue. Some theorists focus 
on refined intellectual character traits, such as open-mindedness or conscientiousness, which the 
agent cultivates over time through deliberate effort (Code 1987; Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 
1996). On this approach, knowledge is defined as true belief produced by a refined intellectual 
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character trait. Other theorists include reliable cognitive faculties, such as excellent vision or 
memory, among the intellectual virtues (Sosa 1991; Greco 1993; Goldman 1993). On this ap-
proach, knowledge is defined as true belief produced by the agent’s reliable character traits or 
reliable cognitive faculties. Here “reliable” means that the trait or faculty produces mostly true 
beliefs. 
An important initial question is what virtue epistemologists are giving theories of. One pos-
sibility is that they are offering theories of the ordinary knowledge concept, a mental representa-
tion shared by members of a community. This aligns with the dominant methodology of contem-
porary Anglophone epistemology (see Turri 2016c for a review). For example, theorists aim for 
an account that “matches our everyday practice with the concept of knowledge” (Craig 1990: 3), 
describes “the concepts and practices of the folk” (Goldman 1993: 272), or reveals “the folk the-
ory of knowledge” (Jackson 1998: 32). In line with that aim, theorists motivate and evaluate pro-
posals “by reflecting on our thinking and practices” regarding knowledge (Greco 2010: 4). The 
basic idea behind this methodology is that our judgments and behavior provide evidence regard-
ing the content of our concepts. For example, patterns in ordinary knowledge attributions provide 
evidence regarding the content of our knowledge concept. 
Understood as an account of the ordinary knowledge concept, virtue epistemology faces at 
least two serious problems. 
The first serious problem is that knowledge does not require belief, as those categories are 
ordinarily understood. Virtue epistemologists have offered no serious argument that knowledge 
requires belief. The field’s most widely cited review article covers no argument that knowledge 
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requires belief (Greco & Turri 2011). One of the field’s most influential monographs does not 
include “belief” in its index (Greco 2010). One influential theorist simply “affirm[s] that knowl-
edge entails belief” without argument (Sosa 2007: 24), and another merely notes that “a rough 
philosophical consensus has developed” around the idea (Zagzebski 2009: 3). But it is easy to 
name philosophers who have rejected the idea (e.g. Plato 380 BCE; Radford 1966; Lewis 1996) 
and no attempt is made to estimate the proportion of philosophers who accept the idea. Aside 
from that, the content of ordinary concepts is not determined by consensus among professional 
philosophers and recent findings have shown that alleged philosophical consensus often badly 
mischaracterizes ordinary concepts, including the knowledge concept (for reviews, see Turri 
2016d; Turri 2016c; Buckwalter & Turri in press). 
The conceptual relationship between knowledge and belief is a case in point. Researchers 
have recently discovered that competent speakers are often willing to attribute knowledge with-
out attributing belief (Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel 2013; Murray, Sytsma & Livengood 2012). 
In some cases, the majority of people who attribute knowledge also deny belief. For example, 
participants in one study read about Karen, a first-year university student taking an introductory 
science course (Murray, Sytsma & Livengood 2012). Karen’s instructor and textbook teach that 
the earth revolves around the sun. This conflicts with what Karen’s religious parents taught her 
growing up: they taught her that the sun revolves around the earth. On the final exam for the sci-
ence course, Karen encounters the question, “True or false: the earth revolves around the sun.” 
She answers “true.” After reading the case, participants were asked whether Karen knows that 
the earth revolves around the sun, and whether Karen believes that the earth revolves around the 
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sun. Of those who attributed knowledge, the vast majority (85%) denied belief. Moreover, in an-
other series of experiments, regression analysis and causal modeling suggested that even when 
people attributed both knowledge and belief, their knowledge attributions were not based on their 
belief attributions (Turri & Buckwalter in press; Turri under review; Turri, Buckwalter & Rose 
under review). Finally, reaction-time studies have shown that people attribute knowledge faster 
than they attribute belief (Phillips, Knobe & Cushman 2015). If knowledge attributions occur 
before belief attributions, then the former are not based on the latter. 
What explains this conceptual disconnect between knowledge and belief? One hypothesis is 
that belief ordinarily understood is connected with feeling or emotion in a way that knowledge is 
not (Buckwalter, Rose & Turri 2015; Buckwalter & Turri 2016). As William James wrote, by its 
“inner nature,” belief “is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything 
else” (James 1889: 21). According to Hume (1748/1993: 32), this is how belief is understood “in 
common life.” By contrast, knowledge might not entail anything about how someone feels. If 
knowledge does not entail anything about how someone feels but belief does, then knowledge 
cannot entail belief. Another hypothesis, consistent with the first, is that the belief concept is es-
sentially connected to distinctively human conversational practices of explicitly justifying and 
excusing behavior, whereas the knowledge concept is essentially connected to the much older 
animal practice of predicting behavior (Turri under review). On this hypothesis, the two concepts 
play different roles in our social-cognitive economy and there is no reason to expect entailment. 
The second serious problem is that knowledge does not require reliability. Theorists have 
provided some arguments that knowledge requires reliability. One main passage cited in favor of 
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the reliability requirement contains a brief explanatory argument (Goldman 1979). The passage 
begins by claiming that knowledge must be appropriately caused and then asks what kind of 
causes yield knowledge. Two lists are then produced. One list features processes that intuitively 
do produce knowledge: perception, introspection, memory, and “good reasoning.” The other list 
features processes that intuitively do not: “wishful thinking,” “mere hunch,” “guesswork,” and 
“confused reasoning.” It is noted that members of the first list all seem to be reliable, whereas 
members of the latter all seem to be unreliable. A possible explanation for the membership of 
these lists is that knowledge requires reliability. Surprisingly, this has been dubbed the “master 
argument” lending “powerful prima facie support” to the claim that knowledge requires reliabili-
ty (Goldman 2012: 4). But it should not persuade us because alternative explanations are not 
considered. For example, the hypothesis that knowledge requires cognitive ability, reliable or 
not, can explain the membership of these lists. The list of processes that produce knowledge in-
cludes cognitive abilities to detect, discover, and retain truths; the list of processes that do not 
produce knowledge does not include abilities of detection, discovery, and retention. 
A second argument for the reliability requirement is that it explains patterns in ordinary in-
tuitions and judgments about knowledge. Theorists claim that reliabilism is attractive because it 
“explains a wide range of our intuitions regarding what does and does not count as 
knowledge” (Greco 2010: 6); it fits with our “ordinary, intuitive judgments” (Dretske 1981: 
92ff); it “matches our everyday practice with the concept of knowledge as actually found” (Craig 
1990: 3-4); it can explain “our inclinations” and “intuitions” about knowledge (Goldman 1993: 
271). This proto-reliabilist hypothesis about folk epistemology generates testable predictions. On 
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one hand, people will not count unreliably produced belief as knowledge. For example, if an 
ability produces only ten percent or thirty percent true beliefs, then the beliefs it produces will 
not be judged knowledge. On another hand, vast and explicit differences in reliability will pro-
duce large differences in knowledge judgments. 
A recent series of studies tested both predictions by eliciting knowledge judgments about 
simple cases while varying how reliably beliefs were formed (Turri 2016a). Both predictions 
were falsified. Rates of unreliable knowledge attribution reached 80-90%. People consistently 
attributed knowledge to reliable and unreliable believers at similar rates. People attributed 
knowledge despite actively classifying the knower as unreliable, and they overwhelmingly de-
clined to attribute knowledge in closely matched controls. More generally, although people un-
derstood and processed explicit information about reliability, they did not seem to consult this 
information when making knowledge judgments. For example, in one study, participants were 
divided into two groups (Turri 2016a: Experiment 4). They all read a story about Alvin, who has 
been out running errands all day. In the morning, Alvin’s wife told him that he should stop at the 
dry cleaners. On his way home, Alvin stops at the dry cleaners. Participants in the unreliable 
condition were also told that Alvin’s memory is very “unreliable”; participants in the reliable 
condition were told that Alvin’s memory is very “reliable.” That was the only difference. Partici-
pants were then asked whether Alvin knows that he should stop at the dry cleaners. In the unreli-
able condition, participants categorized Alvin as unreliable and 86% of them attributed knowl-
edge. In the reliable condition, participants categorized Alvin as reliable and 88% of them at-
tributed knowledge. The same pattern occurred when using different dependent measures, differ-
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ent narrative contexts, for male and female agents, and for different faculties. 
A third and related argument for the reliability requirement is that it explains our intuition 
that knowledge is better than mere true belief, which has been a central concern in recent Anglo-
phone epistemology (for a review, see Pritchard & Turri 2014). Consider two pleasing art-muse-
um exhibits that, as it turns out, are intrinsically indistinguishable. One was produced by an 
artist’s highly reliable ability to produce pleasing paintings; the other was produced by an artist 
accidentally spilling some painting supplies. Intuitively, the former is better than the latter. Simi-
larly, consider two true beliefs in the very same proposition. One was produced by reliable eye-
sight; the other was produced by wishful thinking. Again, intuitively, the former is better than the 
latter. We seem to value a successful outcome more when it is due to a reliable ability than to 
luck. Why? One hypothesis is that an agent deserves more credit for an outcome produced by 
reliable ability than for an outcome produced by luck. But an alternative hypothesis is that an 
agent deserves more credit for an outcome produced by ability, reliable or not, than for an out-
come produced by luck. Recent behavioral experiments support the alternative hypothesis specif-
ically for cognition (Turri 2016a: Experiment 7). When given a choice to credit a correct answer 
to an agent’s ability or to luck, people credited it to luck when it was based on a guess, but they 
credited it to ability when the agent exercised her ability. Importantly, they credited it to reliable 
and unreliable abilities alike. And their knowledge judgments were strongly correlated with cred-
it attributions. Crediting the correct answer to ability rather than luck increased the odds of at-
tributing knowledge by a factor of 38 (i.e. 3800%). 
In light of current evidence, I conclude that virtue epistemology fails as a theory of the or-
 !7
dinary knowledge concept. Knowledge ordinarily understood is not true belief produced by intel-
lectual virtue. 
But perhaps capturing the ordinary knowledge concept is not what some virtue epistemolo-
gists aim for. Perhaps some virtue epistemologists are offering theories of knowledge itself, a re-
lation between cognizers and facts or truths, whose essential features might be absent or misrep-
resented in the ordinary knowledge concept. If virtue epistemologists were doing this, then pre-
sumably they would motivate and evaluate theories in light of relevant findings from cognitive 
science on how organisms acquire, store, and use knowledge. This methodology is sometimes 
used in contemporary Anglophone epistemology (e.g. Machery 2009 on concepts; Carruthers 
2011 on self-knowledge), but it is almost entirely absent from the mainstream virtue epistemolo-
gy literature. 
I am aware of one potential exception to this generalization (Kornblith 2002: chapter 2; see 
p. 56 n. 39 for an explicit connection to virtue-epistemological theories of knowledge). On this 
exceptional approach, knowledge is defined as reliably produced true belief. This definition is 
motivated by the role knowledge attributions play in the systematic scientific study of animal 
behavior. Animals have biological needs, including access to food, shelter, and mates. The satis-
faction of these needs is promoted by the evolution of capacities for receiving, storing, and pro-
cessing information about the environment. Cognitive psychologists classify such informational 
states as “knowledge” that generates behavior contributing to fitness. A key passage summarizes 
the basic argument for this approach to knowledge, illustrated with reference to piping plovers’ 
remarkable nest-protection behavior: 
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Notice that these explanations require more than just the category of true belief. If we 
are to explain why it is that plovers are able to protect their nests, we must appeal to a 
capacity to recognize features of the environment, and thus the true beliefs that partic-
ular plovers acquire will be the product of a stable capacity for the production of true 
beliefs. The resulting true beliefs are not merely accidentally true; they are produced 
by a cognitive capacity that is attuned to its environment. In a word, the beliefs are 
reliably produced. The concept of knowledge which is of interest here thus requires 
reliably produced true belief. (Kornblith 2002: 58). 
I applaud the careful, valuable, and insightful engagement with relevant scientific literature 
embodied by this approach. However, its conclusion does not follow, for two reasons. First, if 
“belief” is being used in its ordinary sense, an informational state is not automatically a belief. A 
representational state that was not a belief could still provide plovers with the relevant informa-
tion, so belief is not essential. But arguably this is a tolerable extension of “belief.” Second, and 
more importantly, unreliable cognitive capacities can play the relevant role. Reliability, in the 
sense of producing more true representations than false ones, is not needed. In particular, unreli-
able cognitive capacities can serve informational needs, guide behavior, and thereby promote 
fitness. 
This can be illustrated with a different avian example: predator alarm calls among willow 
tits. In one study, over 80% of calls were false alarms. Despite viewing this “high proportion” as 
“remarkable,” the ornithologist concluded that evolution “selected for such a low threshold” be-
cause it increases survival in the long run (Haftorn 2000: 445). Despite its unreliability, the ca-
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pacity for receiving predator alarm calls serves an important informational need. This fits a gen-
eral pattern in evolutionary analysis: in order to be selected for, a trait need only promote a bene-
ficial outcome often enough to enhance fitness. If the benefit of a single success is great enough, 
even a highly unreliable trait could be selected for. 
There is a better account of the knowledge concept operative in the science of animal be-
havior: knowledge is an accurate representation produced by cognitive ability. The relevant abili-
ty could be reliable or unreliable. The representation might be a belief or it might take some oth-
er form. Interestingly, the experimental results discussed above suggest that this same account of 
knowledge also fits the ordinary knowledge concept very well. In particular, it would explain 
why people overwhelmingly attribute knowledge to agents who get the right answer through un-
reliable ability. It would also explain why information about reliability does not affect knowledge 
attributions whereas information about ability does. Thus I propose that knowledge ordinarily 
understood and scientifically understood amounts to the same basic thing: accurate representa-
tion produced by cognitive ability. I call this theory of knowledge abilism (for defenses, see Turri 
2015a, Turri 2016a, Turri 2016b). 
Relatedly, there are also positive theoretical arguments for the possibility of knowledge 
produced by unreliable ability (Turri 2015b). One such argument begins with the observation that 
achievements can be unreliably produced. For example, human toddlers around twelve months 
old are highly unreliable walkers, but many of their early steps are genuine achievements reflect-
ing their blossoming bipedalism. More generally, achievements populate the road to proficiency 
in many spheres, despite our unreliability. This is true in art, athletics, politics, oratory, music, 
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science, and elsewhere. If achievement in all these spheres tolerates unreliability, then knowl-
edge probably does too. 
So far I have argued that virtue epistemology fails as a theory of knowledge ordinarily un-
derstood and scientifically understood. But sometimes virtue epistemologists seem to be aiming 
for something different from either of those things. In particular, sometimes they seem to be pre-
scribing a technical concept to serve some other purpose. For example, some theorists “analyze” 
the knowledge concept, and other epistemological concepts, in order to improve education and 
intellectual culture (Roberts & Wood 2007: 27-9). Unfortunately they provide no evidence that 
their analyses can accomplish such laudable goals, or that philosophical analysis fares better 
than, say, research in the learning sciences to promote beneficial change (Turri 2011). Sensible 
prescriptions are accompanied by relevant cost-benefit analysis, which in the present case would 
presumably include results from social scientific and psychological studies. 
Relatedly, some theorists aim for a “metaphysical analysis” improving on the ordinary 
knowledge concept (Sosa 2015a; Sosa 2015b). “Conceptual improvement” involves carving a 
“domain more closely at the joints” than is accomplished in “ordinary speech and thought” (Sosa 
2015b: 33). Empirical science provides many examples of conceptual improvement. For in-
stance, biologists improved our ordinary fish concept by removing cetaceans from its extension. 
Similarly virtue epistemologists might “find in the phenomena themselves differences” important 
enough to warrant revising the ordinary knowledge concept. The central phenomenon here is 
“human knowledge,” which is “a state that people host” (Sosa 2015b: 9). But in order to find dif-
ferences in a phenomenon itself, a field must study the phenomenon itself or be closely informed 
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by research that does. Biologists improved our fish concept by studying marine organisms’ 
anatomy and physiology, not by entertaining thought experiments about marine organisms. By 
contrast, virtue epistemologists do not study humans and their states; nor is virtue epistemology 
closely informed by relevant research in the cognitive, social, or life sciences. As currently prac-
ticed, virtue epistemology, including the variant aiming for metaphysical analysis, proceeds by 
collating judgments about thought experiments. This will not produce conceptual improvement 
of the sort advertised. 
To take another example, some theorists propose an analysis of the knowledge concept that 
addresses “contemporary concerns” while remaining “faithful to the history” of epistemology, is 
“practically useful,” “permits a natural extension” to analyses of understanding and wisdom, and 
“links” epistemology with “the general study of value” (Zagzebski 1996: xvi, 262-4, 275, 336). 
But it is unclear whether this project is well motivated or even viable. Consider the challenge 
involved in defining a coherent concept that remains “faithful” to the history of epistemology. 
Some accounts of knowledge — or, rather, something translated as “knowledge” — require cer-
tainty; others do not. Some accounts require belief; others do not. Some accounts rule out per-
ceptual knowledge of our immediate environment; others treat it as a paradigm case of knowl-
edge. Focusing just on this last contrast, one reaction is to “favor a compromise position” that 
treats perceptual knowledge as degenerate or “low-grade” (Zagzebski 1996: 280). Another reac-
tion is to favor a vague account that takes no stand on the matter, implying neither that perceptu-
al knowledge occurs, nor that it does not occur (Zagzebski 1996: 282). A third reaction is to 
abandon the idea that there is a single concept at issue: some philosophers theorized about an al-
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leged status that cannot be based on perception, whereas others theorized about a different status 
that can be. Little if anything important is gained by crafting a concept that enables us to treat all 
these philosophers, who lived in different epochs and spoke different languages, as engaged in a 
single conversation or resolvable dispute. And even if we could craft such a concept, there is no 
reason to expect that it would serve any practical use. 
There are many possible purposes for prescribing a technical concept. A virtue-epistemo-
logical knowledge concept could turn out to be well suited for some purposes. At present, I am 
unaware of any such purpose that has been explicitly identified. 
In sum, virtue epistemologists define knowledge as true belief produced by intellectual 
virtue. I have argued that this definition fails in three important ways. First, it fails as an account 
of the ordinary knowledge concept, because neither belief nor reliability is essential to knowl-
edge ordinarily understood. Second, it fails as an account of the knowledge relation itself, at least 
insofar as that relation is operationalized in scientific study of animal behavior. Third, it serves 
no prescriptive purpose identified to this point. Thus, at this point, the evidence suggests that the 
virtue-epistemological definition is false and serves no other useful purpose. An alternative theo-
ry, abilism, provides a superior account of knowledge as it is ordinarily and scientifically under-
stood. According to abilism, knowledge is an accurate representation produced by cognitive abil-
ity. 
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